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-2-seems that even the simplest products (or processes) upon close inspection turn out to have specialized wrinkles, often of doubtful social benefit, ,giving firms special assets. The variety is such that the concept of special assets of firms may become empty without a careful typology.
Motivations for producing within LDCs, rather than exporting to them either goods or services embodying the special asset, are also variegated, ranging from jumping import restrictions to preparing for export cheap LDC resources, such as primary commodities or semiskilled labor. Given the diversity of special assets and of the stimuli triggering foreign investment, one may doubt a priori claims regarding unambiguous welfare implication of TNE activities.
The ambiguity of the welfare implications of TNE activities is reinforced by noting the heterogeneity of LDCs, not just in domestic market size and natural resource endowment, but also in the responsiveness of their government officials to different domestic social groups and in the bargaining ability of those officials. LDC government officials may or may not bargain cleverly and firmly with TNEs; may or may not focus their bargaining on substantive issues; and may or may not distribute equitably the fruits of their bargaining efforts among their fellowcountrymen.
The agnostic approach of this essay is in the spirit of that line of economic thought teaching that private profit-seeking behavior may lead to socially desirable results but only if certain conditions are met, conditions which involve both economic and political variables, and whose presence cannot be taken for granted, particularly in LDCs. If there is a simple formula to understand the nature and consequences of TNEs, this essay has not found it. 
I. The International Firm
Social science has difficulty coming to grips with TNEs. Traditional economic theory, whether neoclassical or marxist, is uneasy in the presence of imperfect competition and the modern corporation. Furthermore the sources and diffusion of technical change are typically incorporated into economic models in a mechanistic fashion. Finally, standard democratic theory has little room for "corporate citizens". Yet much of the practical debate about TNEs, or large corporations in general, revolves around their market power, their contribution to innovation and its diffusion, and their political consequences. Mainstream theory provides little guidance in these debates, either in the North or in the South.
Indeed the positive theory of the capitalist, corporate firm used by many LDC economists, such as Norman Girvan, or by radical economists, such as the late Stephen Hymer, is close to that advanced by heterodox Northern economists such as Raymond Vernon and John Kenneth Galbraith. Such a theory views the modern corporation as an institution which in its search for a satisfactory and secure return to its special asset substitutes reliance on imperfect external markets for internal planning. The more the -4-firm expands and the larger its investments become (with each new investment often having a longer maturation period), the grea~er will 'be the perceived need to control its economic environment so as to reduce business and other risks. Whether the firm commits large funds to develop a mine or a new product, it will feel the urge to strengthen a marketing network yielding loyal customers. Only a lunatic will let auction (spot) markets decide the fate of multi-billion dollar investment projects.
The corporate commitment to private planning involves reliance on hierarchical, bureaucratic organizations internalizing informational networks and encouraging "team spirit". The right balance between centralization and decentralization will be a major preoccupation of top management. Investment decisions, including those in Research and Development, with horizons well into the future will tend to be centralized.
TNEs are viewed as simply the contemporary culmination of the tendency for capitalist firms to expand and control their environment.
Dramatic advances in transport and communication over the last one hundred years facilitated first the expansion of local firms from regional to national dimensions, and more recently from national to international dimensions.
The regional-national-transnational expansion path applies in principle to any capitalist firm, regardless of historical origins or home country. The analytical focus is on the firm, not on countries, nor on an aggregated, homogeneous capital in contrast with some versions of theories of imperialism and dependency, and with standard nonclassical theory. The characteristics of firms at each point in the expansion path will, of course ,differ; TNEs will be fewer and larger than regional corporations.
'
There is constant movement along the path, both upward and downward, fueled by technological innovations, oligopolistic rivalries and by political events. TNEs sit on top of this swarming pyramid, -5-but uneasily. Oligopoly remains, but oligopolists may die. In a changing world, they must continuously reproduce the barriers to entry protecting their leading position.
It is important to emphasize that both oligopoly and innovation are ingredients in this view of capitalist firms and TNEs. One could conceptualize oligopoly with given production functions for an unchanging number of products. Equilibrium solutions to oligopolistic interdependence may then vary according to other specific assumptions, but they will be inferior to either the classic competitive solution or to state ownership with marginal cost pricing. Yet it appears unrealistic to contemplate oligopoly lasting very long without innovation, generated by private firms searching for quasi-rents. The oligopoly-cum-innovation combination is not easily comparable to the classic competitive solution nor to public ownership, hence the recurring debate over antitrust and patents. It could also be argued that while in the long run it is difficult to imagine oligopoly without innovation, under contemporary conditions it is even harder to imagine innovation without oligopoly for some sectors of the economy. The process of innovation and its diffusion need not be predictable nor orderly nor efficient.
Focussing on the firm and on the regional-national-transnational expansion path does not mean that national boundaries are irrelevant for understanding TNE activities. It does remind us that within countries, particularly large ones like the U.S., there are corporations with plants scattered geographically to take advantage of transport economies, -6-proximity to customers and domestic market imperfections. Market imperfections, of course, are more severe once national boundaries are taken into consideration; actual or threatened import restrictions, factor price inequalities and information gaps are some of the most obvious ones.
The vision of a contemporary TNE sketched above differs from the atomistic, price-taking version of the competitive firm found in introductory (but not industrial organization) textbooks. It is different, but is it better or worse from a normative viewpoint? On this question opinions differ sharply, particularly between Northern and Southern observers.
John Kenneth Galbraith has put forth perhaps the best case for large corporations in general and TNEs in particular.~/ The th~sis is that TNEs naturally arise when international trade consists of modern technical, specialized, or uniquely styled manufactured products. Auction markets may be feasible for wheat or sugar, but electric generators will involve customer markets and TNEs.·~./ When advanced technology is involved, it is argued that multinational operations realize the economies of scale.
TNEs are credited with favoring freer trade, with a reduction in economic conflicts among countries where they operate, and even with the creation of the world's first truly effective international civil service (which will be news in the Vatican).
Stephen P. Magee has expressed related notions arguing that TNEs are specialists in the production of information that is less efficient to transmit through markets than within firms.!±._/ TNEs are said to produce sophisticated technologies because appropriability is higher for these than for simple technologies. The appropriability of the returns from -7-information and complementarities among different types of information dictate large firm size. Magee concludes that private market generation pf new information and new techniques may require concentrated industry structures and large firm size, so that any policy proposal aimed at increasing private market technology transfer through reducing the market power of the TNEs via increased intraindustry competition is close to a contradiction in terms.
Neither Galbraith nor Magee is blind to the dangers posed by the concentration of power in the large corporation. Galbraith notes several danger zones and emphasizes that the large corporation has power both in . markets and states, giving it the capacity for anti-social action. Magee notes that: "The rational firm will create artificial and sophisticated masking devices, artificial product differentiation, and expend resources to appropriate the returns on earlier investments .•• A rational monopolist or collusive oligopoly will prevent or delay the introduction of a randomly discovered new unskilled-labor-intensive technology with low appropriability, if it is highly substitutable for an existing technology that has a higher 5/ private present value because of its higher appropriability."-The contradiction between private and social rationality could not be expressed any clearer by a radical economist.
Yet, when all is said, Galbraith and Magee, as well as Kindleberger are resented by the abrupt fashion in which they transfer their activities from, say, high-wage to low-wage areas, presumably a stimulus which would also have triggered resource reallocation under purely competitive conditions, but perhaps more gradually. Put another way, up to a point TNE private planning may make for fiercer oligopolistic competition in customers' markets.
Charges that international markets are characterized by oligopoly are sometimes dismissed by Northern observers with the remark that imperfect markets bear no necessary link to profits, and that profit rates registered by TNEs do not seem abnormal over the long run, especially when all research and development expenses are taken into account. Even if published reports were reasonably accurate, the remark overlooks the debate over the "perks" in LDCs or whether they earn higher profit rates than local firms remain debated issues. Such generalizations may never be possible outside some kind of typology, to which the rest of the paper turns. Even with typology, however, extant empirical work warrants few strong generalizations on the economic (not to mention political) consequences of TNEs in LDCs.11/
II. TNEs and LDC Exports
This section will touch on some issues arising from two types of LDC activities primarily oriented toward foreign markets and involving TNEs.
For minerals the involvement is old and has been declining, at least in relative terms; for non-traditional LDC exports the involvement is fairly recent and shows great dynamism. There are a number of intriguing similarities as well as contrasts between TNE-LDC old-fashioned interactions in minerals and plantations, and those recent ones involving labor-intensive exports generated in free-trade or border zones. In both cases the operations have "enclave" characteristics, with heavy import dependence and limited linkages into the domestic economy. In both cases TNEs control information and marketing networks to such an extent that host governments have little idea of prices, costs, and other accounting details. Under the Cuban ancien regime, U.S. sugar corporations producing within the island provided some insurance against protectionist excesses emanating from the U.S.
Congress; a similar role as friend-in-court is now played by Northern TNEs While there is a presumption that export-oriented TNE activities in LDCs will yield net economic benefits to host countries, the magnitude of benefits could be eroded by overly generous subsidization of social overhead capital and other inputs, ~uch as credit. It is not inconceivable that there may be projects for which the host country gains less from taxing mineral rents or from returns to labor above opportunity cost, than what it gives away in subsidized capital.
III. TNEs and LDC Import Substitution
As early as the 1920s some Latin American observers began to differentiate between two types of inflowing direct foreign investment: that associated with exports of minerals and other primary products, and that going into the nascent import-substituting manufacturing sector. The latter was more popular than the former. Since then, particularly since the In a more realistic model which recognizes that the small country deals with a foreign firm with monopolistic power, perhaps due to the 1 firm's special asset, it can be shown that an import tariff which does not induce a decision by the foreign firm to produce locally could lead to the small country being better off than either having a zero tariff, or one so high that it triggers a capital inflow for import substitution. If the "switchover" tariff is less than the optimal tariff when only imports are contemplated, the small country could maximize its welfare by prohibiting subsidiary production ("switchover") and 
IV. Technology and R~les
This last section will say a few more words on the subject of TNEs and technological transfer to LDCs, and will raise the question whether the bargaining between TNEs and LDCs can be aided by international rules.
Reliable empirical evidence on the different channels of technological diffusion and on the varying costs of each channel to receiving countries is not plentiful. What seems clear is that TNEs are neither the only nor necessarily the cheapest (for LDCs) mechanism for technological diffusion. Producers of machinery,consultants, students, and specialized publications are some of the other conduits of technological diffusion, which under some circumstances become attractive alternatives to parts of the TNE package.
One should note that a TNE presence in LDC manufacturing, by itself, is no evidence of technological diffusion to LDC residents; it is only a geographical fact. At one extreme the TNE may keep to itself all relevant -25-knowledge, leaving local residents as ignorant of the technology as if they were importing the product. At the other extreme, the TNE presence ~ould lead to a costless copying of its technological advantage by competing local entrepreneurs, although.it is difficult to see why the TNE would actively promote such a process. TNEs could, however, promote technical improvement among local producers supplying inputs to the TNE.
A low-cost and rapid diffusion, involuntary and undesirable from the viewpoint of most TNEs,is most likely to occur in large semi-industrialized LDCs than in small and very poor LDCs.
The peculiarities of technological knowledge as a commodity make both LDCs and industrialized countries perceive that they are cheated by the somewhat metaphysical international technology market. Anxious Bargaining between LDCs and TNEs, whether over Hotelling-Solow and Ricardian rents, or over technological marketing quasi-rents or over rents generated by protection, is likely to remain rough and bitter.
The normal rate of return to capital found in theoretical constructs is not easily definable in concrete, ever-changing circumstances. Policies of individual LDC governments toward TNEs will no doubt continue to -27-fluctuate, sometimes erratically, depending on whether a given LDC has been most recently impressed by TNE excesses, or by the difficulties ,and frustrations of effectively running the apparatus of control over foreign investors. But the secular trend is unlikely to be away from growing LDC assertiveness, with public sectors continuing to be the host country major counterparts to TNEs in the bargai~ing game. Under these circumstances, rhetoric and debate will also remain apocalyptic. LDCs will continue to be lectured on the dangers of To most LDC policy makers these systemic preoccupations are likely to appear premature. Their key preoccupation must remain the exact role, if any, TNEs can play in accelerating development in their countries. Governments of LDCs with both political will and local expertise will naturally be in a better position to guide and control 
